Group influence processes will be studied as a function of information other jurors may provide about the case. Each juror bases his prediscussion judgment on but a segment of the information in a complex case. To the extent that each juror contributes his salient information in discussion, and to the extent that mutual overlap is minimized, any juror's post-discussion response should shift toward the incrimination value of the group's information. This proposition will be tested in two experiments. In the first, each case will contain a homogeneous level of incriminating evidence. Ss will make individual judgments and give the reasons (points of evidence) for their judgments. They will then receive notes from other "jurors", contrived so that evidence cited by others is either redundant or non-redundant with the individual's salient evidence. It is expected that post-comparison judgments will become more extreme only if evidence cited by others is nonredundant with evidence initially salient to S. Second, juror leniency/harshness will be varied, and cases will contain a preponderance of evidence of one sort (e.g., incriminating) but a minority of evidence of the other sort (e.g., nonincriminating). After individual judgments, S will give the five evidential facts most important to his decision. Each of five contrived other jurors will then provide S one piece of evidence salient to them, so that S will receive evidence either in the same incriminating/nonincriminating proportion as his, in the opposite proportion, or in mixed (.50) proportion. Other Ss will read only the notes, without first reading the cases. It is expected that post-comparison responses will be more extreme given the first proportion, but less extreme given the latter proportions. Depending on effects of the personality variable, further studies will explore ways of modifying bias.